INTRODUCTION
identified three important elements of behavior in microeconomic systems in experimental economics. These three elements fonn a triad consisting of the environment, the institution, and the observed behavior itself. The testi ng of alternative institutions given induced values in the laboratory has been used frequently ever si nce Smith developed the induced valuation framework. With the luxury of controlling the preference environment, economic experimentalist can observe, with precision, the behavior which marufests in different exchange institutions.
In eliciting homegrown values, especially for deliverable non.market goods, the Jaboratory provides an alternative to contingent valuation surveys, where problems may arise from individuals having unclear and undefined incentives. However, here we reverse the triad so that we need an exchange insti tution that will accurately measure these homegrown values.
These homegrown values in experimental markets are similar to values obtained in real markets because these experimental institutions create a valuation environment with tangible incentives such that it greatly reduces the possibility of individuals having undefined incentives. Furthennore, in studies measuring the value of a nonmarket good, such as food safety, experimental auction markets seem to work reasonably well .
Although these economic values are elicited or induced (as is the case with this experiment), there still exists a concern why people change their bids from their .. true" values in auction markets. Particularly in Vickrey sealed-bid second-price auctions, where the dominant strategy is to bid one' s "true" value, why does an individual, who claims that an auctioned good is worth one dollar, bid 95 cents or $1.15? Kagel et al (1987) concluded that in second-price auctions, the dominant strategy equilibrium does not prevail-bids consistently exceeded private values due to ad hoc reasoning. Coppinger et al. (1980) found that secondprice sealed-bid auction prices tended to be below the optimum price, but bidding above the private values were not allowed in that experiment.
According to Harrison et al. (1995) , a reason repeated Vickrey auctions may not always reveal "true" values is that strategic bidding is present. One way, suggested, to test the bid sensitivity is with the use of a random N-th price auction. The random N-th price auction was designed to reduce strategic bidding within repeated auctions by revealing " more information to the bidder about the distribution of values, while avoiding the repeated strobe light on the exact selling price, and by severing the direct connection between value, the market price, and the bid" .
This thesis examines some alternative explanations to why people change their bids by comparing two different auction institutions, and observing respective impacts on behavior.
Because the random N-th price auction is untested with induced values, this new experiment proceeds to compare elicited values from the random N-th price and the Vickrey auctions. If bidding behavior is clearly different between the Vickrey and the N-th price auctions, one auction institution may be superior to the other in the measurement of value. Hence, we step back to test the following hypotheses: H.; Vickrey bid = induced value; H~ Random N-th Price bid = induced value; H 0 : Vickrey bid = Random N-th Price bid. Results suggest that there are no significant differences between the Vickrey and the random N-th price auctions in incentives for an individual to reveal their true values. The random N-th price auction works equally as well as the Vickrey auction in revealing true preferences. In comparing the optimal bidding, both auctions are similar to each other. The fears conveyed by researchers regarding over-or underbidding may be overblown. Except in rare occasions, deviations from "true" values were small, and for the most part, the median bid was equal to their respective private values. A critical question one must ask is do these small deviations (over-or underbidding) affect the measurement of "true" preferences in the laboratory? It seems on the average that the Vickrey auction mechanism captures the measured "true" value quite weJI , even in the repeated trial environment. Table I summarizes the design parameters of other experiments used for reference and our new design. We construct the experiment to detennine whether the Vickrey or the random N-th price auction influences the subjects to reveal their " true" val ues truthfully. As listed in Table 1 , the fixed design parameters are (i) the auctioned good-a token; (ii) initial monetary endowment of $5.00; (iii) number of trials per stage-5 trials with only 1 bindjng in order to control for wealth effects; (iv) subj ect participation from the student population at lowa State University on a strictly voluntary basis; and (v) we described the optimal strategy without explicitly saying, " Bidding your uue value is the optimal strategy." Table 2 summarizes the actual experimental design. There were four groups of 8 to 10 participants. All groups participated in all three stages of the experiment. The stages were in an ABA format, where A = Vickrey and B = Random N-th Price for groups 1 and 2, and vice versa for groups 3 and 4. Groups 1 and 2 had a different sequence of auction types than groups 3 and 4 to control for order effects. Before the introduction of a new auction, two practice trials were conducted, and a written quiz was given to all participants to minim ize any confusion or misunderstanding of the procedures. For the random N-th price auctions, the N-th price was predetermined via a random number generator, where N could take on values 2, 3, 4, or 5. Table 3 li sts the randomly determined pri vate values. Before each stage of the experiment, subj ects were given new private values from the distributions in Table 3-D 1 corresponds to stage 1, 0 2 corresponds to stage 2, D3 corresponds to stage 3, and PR corresponds to the practice trials. Randomly assigned private values were varied to reduce feelings of discouragement by participants who receive a low private value in the first stage.
EXPERIMENT AL DESIGN AND PROCEDURE
The key rufference with previous Vickrey auction experiments is that the bidder kept the same induced value for all five trial s. We did this to observe individual differences and strategic behavior between trials. Keepi ng the same induced value from trial 1 to trial 5 in each stage, we held the individual and private value constant, hence we can observe bidding behavior between trials, while eliminating individual differences in bidding behavior due to rank of the induced value. Furthermore, assigning different induced values for each trial, instead for each 2, 8.4,6.7,6.4, 5.5, 3.9, 1.9, 1.1 , 0.6, 0.1] DI [9.6, 6.9, 6.7, 5.7, 5.5, 3.5, 2.9, 1.3, 1.2, 1. l] 
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Subjects did not have knowledge of the distributions in Table 3 . Identification numbers were also assigned to each participant, and reassigned only if it was revealed for any reason.
All subjects were told the following optimal bidding strategy: "Although you may bid above or below your private value, it is to your advantage to bid your true value. If you bid above your true value, you increase your chances of paying more than what the token is worth.
And if you bid below your private value, you decrease your chances of winning the auction."
[t is important to note that although subjects were aware of the above statement, they were not explicitly told that it is the optimal strategy. Next the bid for the token was written on a recording card, and collected by the monitor. In the Vickrey auction, the second highest bid and the highest bidder' s identification number were posted. For the random N-th price auction, after all the bids were collected, N was revealed, and then the N-th highest bid along with the identification numbers of the bidders above the N-th price (in order from highest to lowest winning bid) were posted. The winner(s) was required to buy the token at the second or N-th price, depending on the auction. Immediately, the monitor bought the token back from the winner(s) at a price equal to his or her private value. A winner(s) of the auction earns a profit if his or her private value exceeded the market price, and earns a negative profit if private values were less than the market price. Each stage had five trials with only one trial out of five binding to control for wealth effects while preserving the repeated auction framework.
The experiment proceeded as follows. There are several measures of central tendency. The median captures the behavior of the bidders differently than the mean for several reasons. Primarily, in every group, there seems to be that one person who has an agenda totally different from the rest. He or she will over-or underbid dramatically, due to boredom or other reasons totally different from maximizing profit or minimizing loss. Given sample size, this type of behavior effects the mean more so than the median. For example, an individual may have a very low private value, such as 50 cents, and because that individual was told about how the private values were randomly selected, he or she may assume that it is the lowest private value, hence all possibilities of winning the auction and gainffig a profit is practically near impossible. In this scenario, he or she may feel discouraged, and bid zero, which would give a BVR of zero. When calcu:tating the mean-which has a lower bound of zero-this zero bid pu:tls down the average BVR, while not affecting its median value.
Although an individual with a low private value may behave irrationally, the mean does not
show that boredom or discouragement was the motivating factor behind the low BVR. In other words, when calcu:tating the mean a person with a private value of $9.60 who bids zero is treated the subject with a low private value has greater knowledge-due to the posting of the market price in the previous trial-that the punishment for overbidding is less likely to occur, and as the stages progress, the penalty for overbidding becomes practically non-existent. The same reasoning applies to underbidding penalties for subjects with lower private values. Furthermore, a bidder is aware of the range in which the private val ues come from, hence a bid of $1 .25 for someone with a low private value of 50 cents gives a BVR of 2.5. Unfortunately, in calculating the mean, it treats the above instance equally as someone, with a private val ue of $6.00, bidding $15 .00. ln retrospect, the median reflects the effectiveness of the auctions in measuring true preferences more accurately and j ustifiably than the mean. The median value avoids the wide swings due to outliers and bidders who are at the tail of the value distribution .
After conducting a simple analysis of variance, the F-test showed that there was no significant difference between any of the four groups, hence all groups were pooled for further analysis. Next we tested if the bid = f(private val ue, trial, auction type, stage). Consequently private values, trial numbers, auction types, and stages were regressed on the bids. In the equation (1) Consequently, these results suggest that the bid is a function of private value (Bid = f(Private val ue)) or otherwise-depending on which statistica l test is appropriate (see Appendix B).
Furthermore p 1 is equal to 0.9229, which we have found to be significantly different from zero, but is it significantly different than one (Ho: p 1 = 1 )? T-tests show that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 5% level of significance. Our inability to reject that p 1 = 1 statistically supports that the average participant in both auctions did reveal thei r true preferences. Table   5 summarizes the regression results.
Looking at the median BVR, a nonparametric test is conducted to calculate si mple linear rank statistics based on Wilcoxon scores (Table 6 ). Via the Kruskal-Wallis test, the independent variables, Trials and Stages, are not significant (X 7=0. 86702, x 1=0.684 16 respectively). ln other words, the distribution of the BVR has the same location parameter across all five trials, and likewise across all three stages. Via the Mann-Whitney U test, the independent variable Auct10ns is significant at 10% , but not at the customary 5% level (x.,-3.035). This result supports our hypothesis-Vickrey auction -random N-th price auction -when examining the T bl 5 S a e ummarv o f R egress1ons. 
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Regression results show that p 1 is significant in all equations, therefore we can reject H~ p,=O at the 1 % level. Can we reject ij : p = 1 for all equations? T-tests show that the null hypothesis can not be rejected for all equations at the 5% level of significance, except for one equation-Bid 1 in Stage 3. Generally, our inabihty to reject the null supports that the average participant in both auctions did reveal their true preferences. Furthermore in Table 7 , the significance of the intercept is noticeably frequent in stage one than in stage two or stage three.
This may imply some learning is taking place.
An alternative statistical test-an unbalanced analysis of variance via generalized least squares-is performed to see if the main effects are significant. In this model , our main effects consisted of the 5 trials, 2 auctions, and 3 stages-each were assigned to a classification level.
The results show that there is no significance for all main effects, except for the 2 auctions. This main-effect significance states that the mean of the dependent variable (BVR) is different for each level of the factor (Vickrey and random N-th price), ignoring the other independent variables in the model. Unfortunately, the model as a whole (adjusted for the mean) explains the dependent variable's behavior rather poorly (F-value = 1. 75, not significant at the 5% level).
If the model itself is inferior, can we confirm the significance of its independent variables respectively?
We can see in detail whether the rank of the induced private values had any noticeable All parameter estimates are biased, and are not unique estimators. *significant at 1 % **significant at 5% ***significant at 10% (standard errors in parenthesis) impact on the way individuals bid (Table 8) . There seems to be no meaningful difference in bidding behavior between the highest and lowest private value. To see any differences between the upper and lower distributions of induced values, they were split into two halves-the lower half consisted of the lowest private value up to the fifth highest private value in the distributi. on; the upper half consisted of the sixth highest private value up to the highest private value in the distribution. Even after partitioning the induced private values by rank into two sections-upper and lower half-there still were no noticeable difference between the two. In the Vickrey auction, 56.26% of the persons in the upper half bid their true value, and 58.00% in the lower half. In the random N-th price auction, the two sections did not differ much either-upper and lower halves equaled 55.34% and 56.68%
The next task was to see if the participants through experience were leamjng to bid their true values as the stages progressed in the experiment. Each auction type was observed by stages. A1though our regression results stated that the stages were not significantly different, in Table 9 , it is suggestive that for both the Vickrey and the random N-th price auctions some learning behavior exjsts between stages. In stage one, 51.58% of the participants bid their "true" value in the Vickrey auction, and 51.11 % of the participants bid their "true" value in the random N-th price auction. In stage two, the percentage of bids equal to their " true" values increases to 55.56% in the Vickrey, and increases to 56.84% in the random N-th price auction. In the final stage, it increases further to 63.16% and 64.44% for the Vickrey and the random N-th price auctions respectivel y. It should be noted that from these percentages, about 90% of the bids were less than or equal to the true values; hence it appears that overbidding was the exception and not the rule, contrary to the results of Kagel et al. (1987) . Furthermore, bids and private values were plotted on a XY axis. Points on the 45 degree line represent a BVR = l , which states that an individual bid his or her true value. From casual observation, the points appear to be distributed closer to the 45 degree line in stage 3 than in stage 1 for both the Vickrey and the random N-th price auctions, which suggest some type oflearning exjsts (see Figures 1, 2, 3 , and 4).
There was no substantial penalty for deviations from their private values by ten cents in either direction when bidding, given the randomly selected private values came from a uniform distribution in ten-cent increments. Individuals had that ten-cent 1 .eeway. For example, if a person had a private value of $5.50, he or she should realize that the next highest private value could be no less than $5.60, and the next lowest private value could be no higher than $5.40.
The worst case would be for a bidder to tie another bidder, and have the winner determined by a coin toss. While such an individual increases his or her chances of losing the auction or earning a negative profit, it is unlikely that either occurrence will be actually realized because of their ten cent deviations in their bids. As mentioned earlier, the ten-cent leeway may appear safer as the trials progress. After trial one, some information regarding the induced value distribution is available, such that a subject who has a private value lower than the posted market price may realize he has no chance of winning the auction; hence the "decreasing your chances of winning the auction,, statement becomes less relevant when underbidding; and with it, the "increasing your chances of paying more than what the object is worth,, statement becomes less relevant when overbidding. Bids that were within ten cents of their private values (Bid ± 10 cents) were treated as if they were equal to their true values respectively. Table lO shows the new percentages after bids were allowed to fluctuate plus or minus ten cents from their true values. Compared to Table 9, Table 10 shows that the percentage of individuals who revealed their true preferences increased in both auctions in all three stages. Tables 9 supports that the Vickrey auction does a good job in measuring true preferences, and if some confidence interval is allowed, such as in Tab.le 10, the Vickrey auction performs even better.
Discussion and Recommendations
The results of this experiment bear several thoughts. In measuring " true" preferences, the Vickrey auction does a reasonable job. Although there are individuals who bid above or below their given private val ues, they do not deviate drastically. The deviations seem to be within the given environment with its rules and regulations. Our laboratory environment did not have severe punishment for strategic bidding below the market price, but it did have certain economic forces-such as increasing probabilities oflosing the auction as bidding progressively The concern about Vickrey auction' s failure to measure values seems to be unwarranted.
Moreover, the random N-th price did not perfonn any better than the Vickrey. There is a logical reason why the random N-th price auction did no better than the Vickrey auction.
Given if the Vickrey auction performs the best under the given circumstances, the random N-th price auction must either be equal to or less than the Vickrey auction in the same performance criteria. It seems illogical to kill a bird with two stones when the same can be done with one stone. Jn other words, using the random N-th price auction to measure value, when the Vickrey auction performs equal or better at the task in question, is overkill.
Although our results show that the Vickrey auction : ; : : : random N-th price auction, we fail to answer the following question, "Why do people change their bids." To answer thi s question in the future, experiments may need to incorporate carefully structured questionnaires. Like any effective questionnaire, it should answer what it has sought out to answer; and it should contain questions which can be cross-referenced to test for validity and consistency. If such a wellstructured questionnaire can be developed, we may come closer to answering why people change their bids. The drawback is that such a questionnaire takes time to answer, and may distract the subjects since we normally do not fill out questionnaires when buying a market good.
In redesigru ng this experiment, it should attempt to incorporate some elaborate kind of questionnaire and increase the distribution in monetary terms to increase the profits as well as increase the losses. Moreover other independent variables may include: Optimal strategy told versus untold between groups; optimal strategy told versus untold within a group-say it before the third stage in an ABA format. This newer and "improved" experimental design will require more groups, thus more participants, and it seems onJy appropriate to perform such a monumental task on a computer. Consequently, an appropriate computer program needs to be written, and as an uJtimate result, we may be able to find the answer to why people change their bids.
APPENDIX A. EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS
You will receive $10.00 for your participation in this experiment. Because you will be required to pay for any product purchased, your take home income may vary.
The experiment has three stages. You will be bidding for tokens. In each stage, you will be asked to subntit your bidding price on the recording card. You may not reveal your bids to any other participant.
Furthermore, each participant will be given an identification number and a private value before each stage. The identification number and the private vaJue must be kept confidential as well. The purpose of the identification number and the private vaJue will be explained a little later.
Before the actual three stages of the experiment, a preliminary practice session will be conducted. During the practice session, you will take a brief quiz to determine whether or not you have understood the instructions. After the quiz, the answers will be discussed together, and any questions regarding the experimental procedures will be answered by the monitor.
From the start to the finish of the experiment, there should be no communication between subjects. AJso, all items that are not part of this experiment shouJd be removed from the desks.
Any violations of these requirements may result in your being ask to leave, and forfeiting all monies earned.
SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS
I . The experiment has three stages.
2. Before each stage, you will receive a private value. In other words, you will receive a total of three private values-one before the beginrung of each stage. You may not reveal your private value to any other participant.
3. Each stage will consist of 5 trial s. In each trial, you will be asked to submit your bids on a recording card. You may not reveal your bids to any other participant.
4. 1n each stage, only one trial will be binding. This means that only one out of five trials will be binding. In essence, each trial has a 20 percent chance of being selected as the binding trial. Furthermore, profits (gained or lost) will be based solely on the results of the binding trial.
5. Before the beginrung of the second and the third stage of the experiment, each auction winner from the preceding stage will receive a new identification number. You may not reveal your identification number to any other participant.
5. Your bids should be non-negative. Wbile you may bid above or below your private value, it is to your advantage to bid your true value. If you bid above your private value, you increase your chances of paying more than what the token is worth. And if you bid below your private value, you decrease your chances of winning the auction.
6. There will be 5 trials 7. Only 1 out of 5 trials will be binding. After the 5 trials, a number will be randomly selected to determine whjch trial is binding. The highest bidder for the binding trial will win the token and must pay the second highest bidding price. Next, the monjtor will buy that token back for the price equal to the highest bidder's private value. Your profit or loss will be based on the results from the binding trial only.
STAGE RA
l. You will be given a private value for the auctioned good (a token). This value must be kept confidential. These private values are detennined randomly according to the following two-step procedure: STEP 1: Random numbers are drawn from a uniform distribution of [$0.10,$10 .00] in 10 cent increments. A uniform distribution means that you have an equal chance of receiving any value from $0.10 to $10.00 in 10 cent increments. STEP 2: Private values of$X 1 through $X 10 (one for each bidder) are randomly assigned from the unifonn distribution. In essence, your private value may be any of the following values with equal probability: $0.10, $0.20, ... ,$9.80, $9.90, $10.00.
2. The private value you will receive is the value at which the monitor will buy the token back.
3. In this auction, the highest bidders (above the nth price) will win the auction, and earn a profit equal to his or her value less the nth highest bid, where n could take on values 2, 3, 4, or 5. The value of n will be detennined randomly.
For example, if the nth value was randomly selected to be 3, then the third highest price will be posted as the market price. Suppose the first highest bid is $1.50, the second highest bid is $1.00, and the third highest bid is 95 cents. Furthennore, assume that the highest bidder's private value is $1.60, and the second highest bidder's private value is 90 cents. The highest bidder and the second highest bidder will win the token and must pay 95 cents (the 3rd highest bid) respectively, and then the monitor will buy that token back from the highest bidder for $1.60 (highest bidder's private value) and from the second highest bidder for 90 cents (second highest bidder's private value). Consequently, the highest bidder will earn a profit of 65 cents ($1 .60 -0.95 ) and the second highest bidder will earn a negative profit or lose 5 cents ($0.90 -$0.95).
ln case there is a tie for the highest bids, the winner will be determined randomly by the monitor.
(Your Private Value) -(nth highest bid price)
Your Profit
4. Please write your bid for the token on the recording card. Also please make sure you write your ID number and the trial number on the recording card. Then the monitor will collect the recording cards and display the highest bidders' ID numbers and the nth-highest bidding price (i .e., the market price).
APPENDIX B. CHO\ V TEST
The following example uses the Auctt0nType variables. The restricted F-test is used to test the joint significance of a subset of independent variables. From our full (unrestricted) (ii)
If the Auction7ype variables contain significant explanatory power, the error sum of squares of the restricted model (ESSr) will be bi gger than the error s um of squares from the unrestricted model (ESSu). We tested the following hypothesis:
Ho: P6 = P 13 = 0 H 1 : at least one is not equal to zero
We found that the F-ratio = 3.4825 is greater than the F-distribution table val ue at the 5% level of significance, hence the null hypothesis was rejected ..
T he C how test is used to test for the existence of a structural change. ln our case, we treat the Vickrey and the random N-th price auctions as two subgroups, each from a separate regression. Eq uation (ii) is used as the restricted model. For the unrestricted model , the same equation (ii ) is used for each subgroup (Vickrey vs. random N-th price}, and ESS from the Vickrey subgroup is added to the ESS from the random N-th price group to give the unrestricted ESS. If structural change has occurred, the ESS, will be larger than the ES~ covering both subgroups. We tested the following hypothesis:
Ho: Po= Ao, P6 = A6, P13 = A13 R.: At least one PJ * A. J
We found that the F-ratio = 1.684 is less than the F-distribution table val.ue at the 5% level o f s ignificance, hence we failed to reject the null hypothesis.
Which result appears to have more weight? T he answe r is "It depends ... " In the Chow test, the inability to reject the null hypothesis impli es that two separate regressions need not be estimated: the data can be pooled. While the Chow test takes into cons ideration a change in the intercept and the slope, the restricted F-test does not test for the significance of the intercept.
The restricted F-test shows that the Auction Type variable has signi ficant explanatory power in the model, but does not treat the two different auctions structurally. If our concern is strictly on the changes in the slope, then the restricted F-test is appropriate . If we want to allow for changes in the slope and the intercept then the C how test is appropriate.
In our study, we may want to allow for a change in the intercept as well as the slope. In time series analysis, the Chow test is used often to test for structural differences in two periods--say prior to a new legislative action and after the action is implemented. O ur subjects were placed in one auction market, and then the auction market changes. Similarly since market changes are structural changes as if via legislative action and time, the C how test seems to carry more explanatory power.
